From Assumptions to Evidence:
Rebuilding Counter-Drone Doctrine on Battlefield Data
By Jacob Wirtzer
ParaZero Technologies Ltd.
Executive Summary
- The high-speed dive assumption is wrong
FPV drone attacks often involve extended low-altitude maneuvering phases before impact, not just kamikaze-style dives
- Survivorship bias distorts reality
Viral combat footage shows only successful strikes, hiding the search-and-positioning phases that represent real defensive opportunities
- Data-driven doctrine enables better defense
Understanding actual attack profiles makes close-range defensive systems far more effective than strategies based on theoretical high-speed scenarios
On today’s battlefield, no weapon has captured as much attention as the first-person view (FPV) drone. Cheap, widely available, and devastatingly effective, these systems have fundamentally changed the way militaries think about force protection. But despite thousands of hours of combat footage circulating online, much of the conversation around FPV drones is still driven by theories rather than measurable data.
One of the most common assumptions is that FPV drones become nearly impossible to defeat during their final attack because they are traveling at extremely high speeds. The image is familiar: a drone appears suddenly, dives aggressively toward its target, and impacts before defenders have time to react.
It makes intuitive sense. The problem is that it doesn’t always reflect reality.
Recently, independent researcher Itamar Weiss published an extensive open-source analysis of Hezbollah FPV drone attacks in Lebanon, reconstructing flight paths, altitudes, and terminal attack profiles using publicly available combat footage. Rather than relying on isolated impact videos or anecdotal observations, the project analyzes how these attacks actually unfold from beginning to end.
The findings reveal a more nuanced picture of FPV warfare, with important implications for how militaries should think about close-range drone defense.
The Final Attack Isn’t Always a Kamikaze-Style Dive
One of the most interesting patterns emerging from the analysis is that many FPV drones do not spend their final moments racing toward a target at maximum speed.
Instead, many attacks show drones descending to relatively low altitude before entering a period of maneuvering. Operators search for their intended target, adjust their approach, avoid terrain or obstacles, and position the drone for the highest probability of a successful strike. Only after identifying the target and selecting the desired angle of attack do many drones accelerate into their final seconds before impact.
Rather than behaving like guided missiles, these drones often behave more like low-altitude hunters.
An FPV operator isn’t simply trying to hit something. They’re often trying to hit the right vehicle, the right position on that vehicle, or exploit a specific vulnerability. Accuracy frequently takes priority over speed. After all, a miss at 170 km/h is still a miss.
Hezbollah FPV Drones Striking Israeli Merkava Tanks
Real Battlefield Data Matters More Than Theory
Open-source combat footage has created countless discussions about FPV tactics, but it also introduces an important challenge: survivorship bias.
The videos that spread across social media are almost always successful strikes. They show the dramatic final seconds of an attack, often giving the impression that drones appear with virtually no warning before impact. The reconstructed flight paths tell a different story.
Many attacks include extended periods where drones maneuver at lower altitude while searching, correcting course, or confirming their target before committing to the strike. Those moments are largely invisible in the clips that circulate online, yet they represent a significant portion of the engagement timeline.
Understanding those moments is critical because they represent opportunities, not just for the drone operator, but for the defender.
Instead of designing defensive doctrine around the final fraction of a second before impact, military planners should examine the entire attack profile. The data suggests that many FPV engagements involve far more time spent maneuvering than conventional wisdom would suggest
Hezbollah FPV Drones Striking Irone Dome Facilties
Why This Changes the Defensive Equation
For armored vehicles and maneuvering forces, these findings reinforce an operational reality that is becoming increasingly important on today’s battlefield: FPV drones rarely attack in a vacuum.
Vehicles are moving. The terrain is changing. Trees, buildings, utility lines, and other obstacles influence the operator’s approach. Pilots frequently adjust their flight path to maintain visual contact while searching for the best attack angle.
Every second spent identifying a target, repositioning, or lining up a strike is another second available for detection, tracking, and interception.
This is particularly relevant for close-range defensive systems designed to protect the final layer around high-value assets.
Instead of assuming every engagement begins with an uncontrollable high-speed dive, the available battlefield data suggests there are meaningful engagement windows where drones are maneuvering at relatively low altitude and manageable speeds before impact.
Those are precisely the moments when last-line-of-defense systems become most valuable.
Defending Against How FPVs Actually Attack
Modern counter-drone strategies increasingly recognize that no single technology can solve every threat. Layered defense remains the cornerstone of effective protection, with long-range detection, electronic warfare, kinetic interceptors, and close-range solutions each serving a distinct role.
The observed flight profiles reinforce the importance of that final protective layer.
DefendAir was developed to intercept hostile drones during the last stage of an engagement using a non-explosive net-based interceptor. Recent successful integrations of the DefendAir to autonomous platforms such the once with with Axon Vision have shown how it provides a close-range layer of protection where other systems may have limited options. Furthermore, a net-based interception overcomes the difficulty of downing FPVs controlled via fiber-optic cables.
As FPV attacks continue to evolve, understanding how drones actually approach their targets becomes just as important as understanding their maximum speed or range.
DefendAir – Where the Threat Ends, Victory Begins.
Let Data Drive Doctrine
The value of projects like Itamar Weiss’s analysis extends well beyond academic curiosity. They provide something the defense community needs more of: measurable battlefield evidence.
The lesson isn’t that FPV drones are slow. Nor is it that every attack follows the same profile.
The lesson is that real-world attacks are flown by human operators making tactical decisions under pressure. Those decisions create patterns. And those patterns can only be understood by studying real engagements, and not relying on assumptions or isolated impact footage.
The next generation of counter-drone doctrine should be shaped by battlefield data rather than conventional wisdom. The more accurately we understand how these attacks actually unfold, the better equipped we will be to build defenses that address the real threat, not the theoretical one.
Russian Drone Targeting a Civilian in Ukrainian Market
DefendAir – Where the Threat Ends, Victory Begins.
